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Abstract—In RPL routing protocol, the DAO (Destination Ad-
vertisement Object) control messages are announced by the child
nodes to their parents to build downward routes. A malicious insider
node can exploit this feature to send fake DAOs to its parents
periodically, triggering those parents, in turn, to forward the fake
messages upward to the root node. In this study, we show how this
behavior can have a detrimental side effect on the performance of
the network, increasing power consumption, latency and reducing
reliability. To address this problem, a new scheme is introduced
to mitigate significantly the effect of the DAO attack on network
performance.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Low-power and Lossy Net-
works, RPL Security, DAO Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY the Low-power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), acollection of interconnected tiny sensor nodes, have been
considered one of the key enabling blocks of the ever-growing
Internet of Things paradigm [1] [2]. Due to their scarce resources,
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has specified the
IPv6 Routing Protocol for LLN (RPL) [3] as the routing standard
for such networks [3][4][5]. Since it was a proposal, the RPL’s
security aspects have been analyzed by several research efforts
reporting the existence of multiple security concerns that need to
be addressed in order to facilitate the adoption of the protocol in a
wide range of applications [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. One
of such security concerns is the DAO (Destination Advertisement
Object) attack, where a compromised node sends periodic DAO
messages to its parent nodes forcing them, in turn, to flood the
network with DAO messages, an action that can severely harm
energy efficiency, latency and reliability of the entire network.
In fact, unlike other control-based attacks, DAO messages are
transmitted in end-to-end fashion, from the sensor node toward
the root (the details of the exact mechanisms are explained in
Section II), so the level of damage is not restricted to the local
scope of the attacker. Indeed, a DAO message sent by a child leaf
node located on the edge of the network will trigger network-
wide DAO transmissions because the DAO must be forwarded
by every intermediate parent between that child and the network
root affecting network performance and consuming its resources
[3][15]. To address this issue, a new simple, yet effective solution
has been proposed in this article with the goal to mitigate the
effect of DAO insider attack on the performance of RPL’s IoT
networks. The acquired results carried out by means of simulation
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experiments have demonstrated the capacity of the proposed
solution in mitigating the attack and almost restoring back the
perceived efficiency of RPL in terms latency, overhead, energy
consumption and packet delivery ratio.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a brief overview of the RPL protocol highlighting its routing
mechanism to build downward routes. Section III introduces a
description of the DAO attack, analyzing its effect on the network.
The proposed mitigation mechanism is introduced in Section IV.
The detail of the protocol evaluation and discussion is in Section
V, while Section VI concludes the paper and discusses future
work.
II. RPL ROUTING PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
A. RPL Topology and Operations
RPL organizes its physical network into a form of Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) where each DAG is rooted at a single
destination and is referred to as a Destination-Oriented DAG
(DODAG) in RPL’s terms [3][4][5]. RPL uses the term upward
routes to refer to routes that carry the traffic from normal nodes
to the LBR whereas routes that carry the traffic from the DODAG
root to other nodes are called the downward routes [3].
To facilitate the upward traffic pattern, a DODAG topology
centered at the network root must be constructed. In such a
topology, each non-root node willing to participate in upward
communication must select one of its neighbors to act as that
nodes default route (DODAG parent) towards the root [3]. The
construction of the DODAG starts with the root multicasting
control messages called DODAG Information Objects (DIOs)
to its RPLs neighbors. The DIOs carry the necessary routing
information and configuration parameters required to build the
DODAG [3][4]. An RPL node receiving a multicast DIO message
will: (1) add the sender address to its candidate parent set; (2)
calculate its distance (rank) with respect to the DODAG root
based on the rank of that candidate parent, routing information
advertised; (3) setup its default route (preferred parent); and (4)
update the received DIO with its own rank and multicast it to
other neighboring nodes, enabling them, in turn, to perform the
previous operations [3][4].
To enable bi-directional communication, downward routes also
need to be constructed. This is achieved by deploying another
type of ICMPv6 control messages, namely, the Destination Ad-
vertisement Object (DAO). An RPL node willing to announce
itself as a reachable destination from the root point of view,
unicasts a DAO to its preferred parent advertising its own
destination prefix. The processing of the received DAO by the
parent relies on the current mode of operation advertised in
the DIO messages. To this end, RPL has specified two modes
for creating and maintaining downward routes, namely, storing
(table-driven) and non-storing (source routing) [3][4].
In the storing mode, when a parent receives a DAO from one of
its children, it: (a) stores the announced destination prefix locally
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in its routing table along with the DAO sender address, as the next
hop to reach that destination; and (b) forwards the received DAO,
in turn, to its own preferred parent to ensure the propagation of
the advertised destination upward to the DODAG root [3][4]. This
process is repeated by each intermediate node until the DAO is
finally received by the DODAG root.
In the non-storing mode of RPL, the same procedure is
followed but a parent receiving a DAO does not store any routing
state. Instead, it simply forwards the message to its own preferred
parent until it is finally received by the DODAG root. Once the
DODAG root receives the transmitted DAO, it records the source
route of the intended destination for later use by the data-plane
[3][4].
III. THE DAO ATTACK
RPL uses DAO messages to build downward routes enabling
bi-directional communication. The specification of RPL does
not stipulate when and how often DAOs are transmitted. Thus,
different implementations may opt to use different mechanisms
to achieve this process. For instance, the study in [15] has
opted to transmit periodically DAOs whereas the Contiki RPL
implementation [16] transmits the DAO based on the Trickle
timers of DIOs. In Contiki RPL, a child node should unicast a
DAO to its preferred parent on three occasions: 1) upon receiving
a DIO from that parent; 2) upon changing its preferred parent;
and 3) upon detecting some specific errors.
An interesting point in this context is that the transmission of
a DAO message by a child node will trigger the transmission of
multiple DAOs proportional to the number of intermediate parent
nodes between that child and the DODAG root. An adversary can
exploit this fact to harm the network by repeatedly and judiciously
(to go undetected) transmitting DAOs to its parent node. A simple
way to mount this attack is to replay an eavesdropped DAO from a
legitimate node by an outsider triggering DAO forwarding upward
by the nodes parents [14]. This kind of attack can be mitigated
using security services provided by the underlying layers or
RPL itself such as MAC-layer encryption and the cryptographic
challenge-response handshake [14]. However, these mechanisms
will not be sufficient to counter an attack where the attacker is
an insider or compromised node [14].
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to address a DAO insider attack in RPL, a new mecha-
nism has been proposed, named SecRPL that restricts the number
of forwarded DAOs by a parent. In fact, there are two options
for how this restriction can be applied: the first is to restrict the
entire number of forwarded DAOs regardless of the source node
(i.e. the node who initiated the DAO); the second is to restrict the
number of forwarded DAO per destination.Here we opt to use the
second option, as the first option would result in blocking some
DAOs coming from non-attacker nodes effecting negatively the
quality of the downward paths. It may also result in DAOs of
some nodes being blocked more than DAOs of some others. In
particular, each parent node associates a counter with every child
node in its sub-DODAG. When the number of forwarded DAOs
for a child exceeds a pre-specified threshold, the parent discards
any DAO message carrying the prefix of the respective child.
To ensure that no node will be blocked due to the time
factor, the counter is reset between each two consecutive DIOs.
Specifically, when the parent node sends out a DIO message, the
counters for all of its children are reset.
Algorithm 1 : DAO Insider Attack Countermeasure
1: procedure INITIALIZATION
2: set DAO For MAX
3: end procedure
4: procedure DIO TRANSMITTED
5: for each child in Children list do
6: child DAO Counter = 0
7: end for
8: end procedure
9: procedure CHILD’S DAO RECEIVED
10: if child DAO Counter < DAO For MAX then
11: forward the child DAO
12: child DAO Counter++
13: else
14: discard the child DAO
15: end if
16: end procedure
V. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the effect of the DAO attack on the efficiency of
the network and the performance of our proposed mechanism
in mitigating that attack, we have conducted a set of experi-
ments using Contiki (Contiki3.0), a lightweight and open-source
operating system designed specifically for low-power resource-
constrained IoT devices [17]. Contiki features a highly optimized
networking stack including several IoT standards such as CoAP,
UDP, 6LoWPAN and IPv6. It also features implementations for
RPL standard fundamental mechanisms. Cooja [18], a cross-
level simulator for Contiki, was used to carry out the simulation
experiments, to emulate the exact binary code that runs on
real sensor devices. Cooja incorporates an internal hardware
emulator called MSPsim [19], which is used in our simulations,
to emulate accurately (i.e. impose hardware constraints) the
Tmote Sky platform, an MSP430-based board with an ultra-low
power IEEE 802.15.4 compliant CC2420 radio chip. We used
the Unit Disk Graph Radio Medium (UDGM) radio protocol, the
CSMA/CA protocol at the MAC layer and the ContikiMAC as
a radio duty cycling (RDC) protocol. The ContikiRPL library
was altered to implement the DAO attack on some nodes. In
particular, we implemented the attack by means of malicious
insider nodes programmed to transmit DAO messages to their
preferred parents periodically at preconfigured fixed periods. A
set of three malicious nodes running the DAO attack were used.
At the application layer, we simulated a periodic data collection
application where each node sends one packet to the sink every
60 seconds (the time of sending is randomly chosen within the
60 seconds period). The sink also sends a reply for each received
packet to simulate the downward traffic. We have considered in
our simulations a uniform distribution where 50 nodes are spread
in a square area of 100m x100m. All nodes are static including
the DODAG root, which is located outside the square area by a
distance of 10 meters. We have selected three nodes at the farthest
edge from the root to act as malicious nodes to cover the majority
of forwarding paths; this is what attacker might think of to harm
the network widely. The number of allowed DAOs forwarded
by a parent per child (DAOMax threshold) is set 10 for our
proposed mechanism. The rate in seconds at which the attacker
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sends DAO messages (attack interval) is varied between 0.25
and 10 seconds. For each scenario, five simulation experiments
with different seeds were run in order to get statistically valid
results. The graphs below show the mean values of the results
and the error bars at the 95% confidence interval of the mean. The
simulation time was selected to be 1800 virtual seconds for each
experiment. The performance evaluation was based the following
metrics
Number of DAOs Forwarded: is the average number of for-
warded DAOs sent by the parent nodes in the network.
Power Consumption (mW): is the average power consumption
at the networks nodes.
Packet Delivery Ratio in the upward direction (Upward PDR):
is the average ratio between the number of data packets sent
out by the network nodes and the total number of data packets
received at the root node.
Packet Delivery Ratio in the downward direction (Downward
PDR): is the average ratio between the number of packets
received at the nodes and the total number of replies sent out
by the root node.
The Upward Latency (seconds): is the average end-to-end delay
of all packets sent by the nodes and received successfully at the
root.
The Downward Latency (seconds): is the average end-to-end
delay of all replies sent by the root and received at the nodes
We have evaluated the performance of RPL, InsecRPL (i.e.
RPL under DAO attack), and SecRPL (i.e. RPL under attack
with our proposed mitigation mechanism) in terms of previous
mentioned metrics. Fig. 1 shows the average number of forwarded
DAO messages per node under various attack intervals. The
DAOMax threshold is set to 10 per destination. As can be
observed in Fig. 1, both InsecRPL and SecRPL have registered
a higher overhead in terms of forwarded DAOs compared to
the reference model (RPL) which is proportional to the attack
interval. However, Fig.1 also shows that SecRPL has registered
much less overhead compared to the insecure version especially
under heavy attack (attack interval of 250 milliseconds). This
also holds true within the case of energy consumption as shown
in Fig. 2, which can be attributed to the mechanism of restricting
the number of DAOs that can be forwarded by a parent per
destination. Indeed, Fig. 2 shows that the InsecRPL has experi-
enced a relatively high power consumption profile, which is much
related to the increase in the DAO overhead. In fact, the power
consumption profile in ContikiOS is calculated by adding up
four components, the idle, listening, transmission and receiving.
Hence, the increase in the number of DAOs forwarded increases
the power consumed by the forwarder nodes (transmission and
receiving components). In addition, it affects the listening time
of a forwarders children nodes, though they are not forwarders
themselves, (listening component) by forcing them to listen for
longer periods due to the congestion at that forwarder node.
The upward and downward latencies of compared protocols
are illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 respectively. Similarly, it is
clear that the DAO attack has an adverse effect on the latency in
both directions, which can be attributed again to the congestion
induced by the attack at the forwarder nodes. In Fig. 5 and 6,
we show the performance of the three protocols in terms of
upward PDR and downward PDR respectively. The figures show
that mounting the attack with a high attacking interval, affects
negatively both the upward and downward traffic patterns (i.e.
under this topology, in fact, the effect of attack may differ under
different topologies or under different data traffic rates). This can
be attributed mainly to the congestion incurred by the increase
in the number of forwarded DAOs. This has been mitigated in
the proposed solution, which registers PDRs comparable to that
of the reference model.
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Fig. 1: DAOs forwarding overhead under various attack intervals
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Fig. 2: Average power consumption under different attack intervals
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Fig. 3: The upward latency under various attack intervals
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Fig. 4: The downward latency under various attack intervals
A. The Effect of the Threshold Parameter (DAOMax)
Another point we study here is the effect of our mitigation
mechanism on the reliability of networks in terms of packet
delivery ratio. It is clear that setting the threshold value to a
small number will minimize the energy consumption and control
overhead but at the cost of reliability. This is illustrated in Figs.
5 and 6. Fig. 5 shows that setting the DAO threshold Max to a
very small value reduces both the energy consumption and control
traffic overhead. However, as illustrated in Fig. 6, this results in
a lower downward PDR for any threshold less than four while
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Fig. 5: The upward PDR under different attack rates
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Fig. 6: The downward PDR under different attack rates
the upward PDR is not affected. This indicates that setting the
DAOMax to a small value negatively affects only the downward
traffic. In fact, setting the DAOMax to a small value will prevent
the intermediate parent nodes from forwarding some critical DAO
messages necessary to build downward routes, thus explaining the
lower downward PDR.
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Fig. 7: Power consumption and control overhead under various thresholds
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented the DAO attack, which is
triggered by having a malicious node send DAO control messages
to its parent. This attack differs from other hello-based exploits
(such as DIS and DIO attacks) since DAO messages are transmit-
ted in end-to-end fashion (i.e. from the sensor node to the root).
Thus, the level of damage is not restricted to the local scope
of the attacker. In fact, a DAO message sent by a child node
located on the edge of the network will trigger network-wide
DAO transmissions since DAO messages are forwarded by every
intermediate parent between that child and the DODAG root. In
addition, this kind of attack can be mounted simply without the
need to compromise security keys from legitimate nodes. We have
shown how this attack may significantly harm the performance of
the network especially in terms of power consumption and reli-
ability. Our experiments illustrate that DAO attacks significantly
increase the control traffic overhead and power consumption
while moderately affecting downward traffic reliability under the
chosen assumptions. We have, further, proposed and assessed a
mechanism to mitigate the effect of such an attack.
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